Dear Sir:
It seems that Sharpe (2) speaks for the majority among the public, the legal profession and legislators, when he takes the strict view of what should be the criteria for involuntary psychiatric treatment. It is not certain whether Sharpe is willing to admit that mental illness exists, or, if it does exist, that it can be reliably identified, even in its severe and obvious forms. It is, however, quite clear that he is not willing to permit involuntary treatment based solely on the presence of severe mental illness causing gross impairment. The prevailing view appears to be that the types of patient illustrated in the cases quoted by Miller (1) should not be brought under any arrangements for involuntary treatment. The argument, if I understand it properly, is that it is unfortunately necessary for these patients (and their families, dependents and social environments) to suffer the consequences of neglect because it is not possible to provide for their treatment without endangering civil liberties. This point of view is very influential, and in many jurisdictions doctors are not required to apply criteria that offend their consciences.
I believe that for the foreseeable future it will be futile to attempt to argue against this point of view. I suggest that, instead, physicians should re-examine their obligations to their patients and to society.
There is no good reason why physicians should have to make decisions affecting personalliberty. Doctors may reasonably be asked to give medical opinions and medical recommendations. There is, however, no special medical expertise that enables a physician to make legal decisions about the detention, release and compulsory treatment of individuals. Historically, certification has been delegated to physicians because it is administratively more convenient and economical: at the time and the place when such a decision has to be made, a physician has usually been called to the scene or can be available in a hospital emergency department; other professionals are not so readily available.
Psychiatrists find it distasteful to be cast in the role of constables and jailers, and it is also damaging to their therapeutic relationship with their patients. Psychiatrists would prefer to be relieved of this burden. ONTARIO MENTAL HEALTH ACT, 1978 Sharpe suggests that alternative avenues should be explored, and gives as an example the possibility of having people with serious mental illness placed under the control of a committee or guardian. These, if! understand Sharpe correctly, have the power under existing law to authorize involuntary custody, and even treatment against the patient's will. I would suggest that provincial medical and psychiatric associations should pursue this suggestion actively, and inquire from provincial attorneys-general if this procedure is immediately available for such cases.
Another alternative would be for medical and psychiatric associations to request that physicians be relieved of the responsiblity for certification, and that this be given to specially constituted mental health tribunals, available on an emergency basis around the clock, to decide upon all matters of commitment, release from commitment, and involuntary treatment. Physicians would then assume their proper role in the process -that of providing medical opinions and recommendations and treatment if authorized.
I believe that psychiatrists should now devote their energies to pressing for changes along these lines. Dr. Brown's opening statement about "the criteria for involuntary psychiatric treatment" confuses two concepts. The basis for involuntary hospitalization derives from the commitment criteria, which vary from province to province. Unless there are legislative provisions authorizing involuntary treatment, the common law applies. It recognizes an individual's right to consent to or to refuse treatment. Where such person is not mentally competent to consent, subsitute consent must, except in emergencies, be provided by someone acting on the person's behalf, such as a relative or a guardian. In law, confinement and treatment are separate issues.
Referring to me, Dr. Brown states that it is "quite clear that he is not willing to permit involuntary treatment based solely on the presence of severe mental illness causing gross impairment." The recent amendments to the commitment criteria under the Ontario Mental Health Act recognize as candidates for commitment, mentally ill persons likely to suffer serious physical impairment without such intervention.
Society long ago abandoned the use of mental illness as the sole determinant for commitment. One ofthe reasons for the rejection by the legislators of the suggestion of some Ontario psychiatrists for the addition of emotional or psychological harm to the commitment criteria was because this would have permitted the commitment of anyone with a mental disorder who was refusing medical intervention.
Ifa person's mental illness renders him or her sufficiently impaired so that the person lacks the mental capacity to make judgments about needed care and treatment, one could turn to provincial mental incompetency legislation (either Mental Incompetency Statutes per se, or special legislation, such as Alberta's Dependant Adults Act, and Newfoundland's Neglected Adults Welfare Act) which provides a mechanism for the appointment by a court of a guardian, who could be granted authority to provide specific forms of care for the incompetent person, including custodial care, where necessary, and to consent to treatment. As Dr. Brown suggests, physicians' involvement here would be in their more traditional capacity of providing medical assessments and opinions for our judges who would consider the evidence and make the most appropriate order in the circumstances. The courage of those who, like Dr. Greben, are attempting to bring order into the chaos of competing psychotherapies is commendable. That his attempt has failed, is our loss. I will try to explain a few of the reasons that I believe have led to this failure.
Gilbert
None of his papers (1-3) contains simple or clear definitions of the central concepts in the discussion. The uncertainties as to what is psychotherapy and what is psychoanalysis (is the former the general term and the latter, the special one?) have not been spelled out. When looking at the founders of special schools of psychotherapy, for example, in psychoanalysis, analytic psychology, existential analysis, and so on, we find that they are all self-proclaimed masters. It is only the followers who have to endure special training. Dr. Greben accepts this state of affairs when discussing his teachers and in so doing implies that they did not belong to any of the canonized schools. But he does not tell us if he is one of them or that he has joined one of the schools. He says: "I was speaking with a psychoanalyst with whom I had trained" (vol. 22, p.377) : Does that mean that Dr. Greben is a psychoanalyst? Why does he constantly avoid stating this clearly so that we may surmise what his vantage point is (see vol. 22, p.376) . No less cryptic is the paragraph: "As stated above ..." (vol. 24, p.499) . It would be helpful to have some clarification here.
Supervision has been throughout the history of medicine, including psychiatry, the method of teaching and learning. The statement that "not surprisingly, it [supervision] came into psychiatry" (vol. 24, p.501) from psychoanalysis is historically incorrect and confusing. We usually quote that which meets our approval, consequently, the paragraph quoting A. Lewis . (vol. 24, p.500) undercuts the possibility of teaching and thus supervision. And the words of Ekstein and Wallerstein (vol. 24, p.50 I) that,
